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Summary findings
The relationship between decentralization of government  Moreover, they find that the origin of a country's  legal
activities and the extent  of rent extraction by private  system - for example, civil versus common legal code
parties is an important  element in the recent debate on  - performs extremely well as an instrument for
institutional design. The theoretical literature makes  decentralization. The estimated relationship between
ambiguous predictions about this relationship, and it has  decentralization, when so instrumented, and corruption
remained virtually unexamined by empiricists.  is even stronger.
Fisman and Gatti make a first attempt at examining the  The evidence suggests a number of interesting areas for
issue empirically, by looking at the cross-country  future work, including investigating whether there are
relationship between fiscal decentralization and  specific services for which decentralized provision has a
corruption  as measured by a number of different indices.  particularly strong impact on political rent extraction,
Their estimates suggest that fiscal decentralization in  and understanding the channels through  which
government spending is significantly associated with  decentralization succeeds in keeping corruption in check.
lower corruption.
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decentralization. Those in favor of devolving powers of revenue collection and expenditure
to local authorities have been guided to a large extent by the rationale, first expressed by
Tiebout  (1956), that decentralization leads to greater variety  in the provision  of public
goods, which are tailored to better suit local populations. On the other side, Tanzi (1996)
has argued that there exist many imperfections in the local provision of services that may
prevent the realization of benefits from decentralization.  For example, local bureaucrats
may be poorly trained and thus inefficient in delivering public goods and services.
More recently, however, Besley and Coate (1999) have shown that there is relatively
little theoretical support for claims of differential provision of services.  Hence, they assert,
decentralization must be justified by political economy explanations.  One such possibility,
which  has  received  much  attention,  is  that  accountability  of  bureaucrats  may  differ
between centralized and decentralized systems.
Recent  studies have come down on opposite sides of this issue: for example, Wade
(1997) suggests that India's overcentralized top-down structure was largely responsible for
corruption  in  the  irrigation  bureaucracy.  In  contrast,  Brueckner  (1999)  claims  that
corruption  is more likely to  be  a problem  among local governments.  By far the most
comprehensive  theoretical  examination  of  these  issues  comes  from  Bardhan  and
Mookherjee (1998). They argue that a centralized bureaucracy creates incentives to divert
resources to the nonpoor, owing to their willingness to pay bribes.  This effect is *faded off
against the vulnerability of local governments to 'capture' by the local wealthy, who seek to
appropriate the  lion's  share of  local  supply. In general,  they  find that  the relationship
between decentralization and the extent of rent extraction by private parties is ambiguous.
2Thus, while there is a sense that decentralization and government corruption are closely
linked, there is much disagreement on what the net relationship between them should be.
Hence,  this  is  primarily  an  empirical  question,  which  has  gone  almost  completely
unaddressed until now.  The only previous work that, to our knowledge, looks at this issue
is by Huther and Shah (1998), who note the negative correlation between corruption and
decentralization.  However, they look only at the unconditional correlation between fiscal
decentralization and corruption.  There are many factors that would obviously be highly
correlated with both variables: in particular, income is highly correlated with 'quality  of
governance',  however measured, and is also strongly correlated with decentralization (it is
well  known  that  development  is  generally accompanied  by  decentralization).  Hence,
problems of omitted variable bias would be extreme in such an analysis.
In  this  paper,  we  make  a  first  attempt  at  systematically  examining  this  issue
empirically, by looking at the cross-country relationship between fiscal decentralization
and  corruption.  We  find  that  fiscal  decentralization  in  government  expenditure  is
consistently associated with lower measured corruption.  This result is highly statistically
significant, and robust to a wide range of specifications, including all of those that have
been used in the recent cross-country literature on corruption.  Moreover, we find legal
origin to be an extremely good instrument for the extent of government decentralization,
and  our results  suggest an even stronger effect  of decentralization on corruption  when
instrumented for in this way.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section I describes the variables used in
our analyses.  In Section II, we provide regression  results  on the relationship between
corruption and decentralization, using country-level data, and Section III concludes.
3I.  Cross-country evidence
II.a  Data description
The data for our test are drawn from a wide range of sources. The Appendix provides a
detailed description of the variables and their sources.
As our principal measure of corruption, we use the International Country Risk Guide's
corruption index (CORRUP7); this is the measure that has been most commonly used in
previous work in the economics literature.  This variable is meant to capture the likelihood
that high  government officials  will demand special payments, and  the extent  to  which
illegal payments  are expected throughout lower  levels  of government  (see  Knack  and
Keefer, 1995).  In addition to allowing for consistency with previous studies, CORRUPT
has the  advantage of having the broadest coverage of countries, which  maximizes our
sample size.  For simplicity and ease of exposition, we have rescaled this and  all other
corruption indices to take on values between zero (least corrupt) and one (most corrupt).
Our measure of decentralization (DECENTR) is given by the subnational share of total
government  spending.  The  numerator  of  this  measure  is  the  total  expenditure  of
subnational (state and local) governments, while the denominator is total  spending by all
levels (state, local, and central) of government.  Our data for these calculations come from
the  International  Monetary Fund's  Government Finance  Statistics  (GFS), for the  years
1980-95.
In order to minimize possible omitted variable bias on the coefficient of our measure of
decentralization, we include in our basic regression a number of controls that are standard
in the cross-country empirical literature on corruption.
4In addition to  controlling for the level of economic development, we include in  the
regression  an index of civil liberties to  capture the extent to which  free press and  free
political associations might act as a check on a corrupted public sector. The index of civil
liberties  was first  developed  by  Gastil and ranges  from  1 (most freedom)  to  7  (least
freedom).
Country  size  is also  an  important source of potential  spurious correlation.  If  large
countries  exploit  economies  of  scale in  the provision  of public  services  (Alesina  and
Wacziarg  1997), and therefore have a low ratio of public service outlets per population,
individuals might revert to bribes "to get ahead of the queue".  At the same time, larger
countries  might  adopt  more decentralized fiscal  systems to  better  cater  to  the diverse
preferences of their citizens. To control for these effects, we include in the regression the
(natural) logarithm of population. Alternatively, we include in the regression a measure of
the size of government as proxied by total government expenditure as a fraction of GDP.
A  number  of  other  variables  have  been  shown  to  be  important  explanatory
variables in corruption regressions. We run specifications including the share of import on
GDP to proxy for openness to trade (OPEN) as suggested by Ades and di Tella (1997) and
Gatti (1999), and ethnic fractionalization (ETHNIC) as pointed out by Mauro (1995) and
Shleifer and Vishny (1993).  Finally, we include specifications with regional dummies and
colonial dummies.
While  many  of our variables  have annual observations, there is  relatively  little
within-country  variation.  Hence, in  our analyses, we  use average values  of all of  our
.5variables  for  1980-95 (the period during  which we  have observations on  corruption).'
Table I reports sample of means of the relevant variables.
II.b Empirical results
Our basic specification is:
CORRUPT,  = a + /JI*DECENTR,  + ,82*10g(GDPd  + /3 3*CIVILi  +  84*10g  (POPd +
Table 2 reports coefficients from OLS estimation on data from a cross section of 57
countries. Significance of the estimates is based on White-corrected standard errors.
Our measure  of decentralization enters the regression with  a  negative and  strongly
significant sign, indicating that countries with more decentralized expenditure have better
corruption ratings. The size of the coefficient implies that a one standard deviation increase
in  decentralization will be  associated with an  improvement in  the country's  corruption
rating of 40 percent of a standard deviation.
Results reported in columns 2 to 6 highlight that the inclusion of the many controls
modifies the slope of the relationship only marginally and does not affect its significance.
In order to  further test the robustness of our results, we employ two other corruption
indices that are commonly used in the economics literature.  These include the so-called
German Exporter corruption index (GCI), developed by Peter Neumann  (1994), and the
World  Competitiveness  Report's  corruption  index  (WCRCI);  see  the  Appendix  for
descriptions  of these variables.  With WCRCI  as our  dependent variable, we  obtained
results  that were  similar to those reported above, in  terms of both  the significance and
magnitude  of  the  effect  of  DECENTR.  When  GCI  was  used,  the  coefficient  on
For our data on fiscal decentralization, there were many missing observations; a country is included in our
6decentralization was somewhat smaller, and its size and statistical significance were much
more sensitive to the choice of specification. Table 3 reports the estimated coefficients and
t-statistics.
It  may be  argued that our estimates suffer from for endogeneity bias.  For example,
corrupt  officials  of  the  central  government  might  be  reluctant  to  allow  fiscal
decentralization,  as this  would  attenuate their  ability to  extract rents.  A more  subtle
argument for the existence of endogeneity relates to the composition of public  spending:
different spending programs may have different potentials for rent extraction. If this is the
case, corrupt governments may lobby to keep administration of activities with high rent
extraction potential  (say defense programs)  at the center, while decentralizing activities
with low rent extraction potential (say education activities).
To correct for potential endogeneity bias, we instrument for the decentralization index
with the dummy variables indicating the legal origin of a country introduced by La Porta et
al. (1998). There is good reason to expect legal origin to perform well as an instrument for
decentralization  in  a  regression  involving  corruption.  Legal  scholars  have  noted  the
'affinity'  of a  Civil (as opposed to  Common) legal code for government centralization,
since the Civil law system emphasizes the need to  conform to the constraints of statutes
laid down by (federal) legislators (see Glos, 1978)2. Consistent with this, in our data, we
find that the proportion of public expenditures accounted for by state/local governments is
analyses as long as data were available for at least one year during the period 1980-95.
2 Obviously, there are many subtleties to this argument; in the interests of space, we defer to the listed
citation for details.  Furthermore, there is some variation within the types of Civil code that is relevant for our
argument.  In particular, the Gerrnan legal heritage has a greater propensity for decentralization than the
French system.  Once again, we obtain results in our data that are consistent with this prediction.
7much higher in  French origin (Civil system) countries than in British origin (Common
system) countries (0.12 vs. 0.21).
The second condition for our instrument to be valid is that legal origin primarily
affects corruption through its influence on centralization.  Work by La Porta et al. (1998)
would seem to bring this into question, as they claim that legal origin influences capital
market  development through its relationship to the extent of investor rights.  While not
directly addressing the issue of corruption, their argument suggests that legal origin may
have an important effect on property rights that would surely affect, in turn, corruption.
Note, however, that their claims have been disputed recently in work (concurrent with our
own)  by  Rajan  and  Zingales  (1999),  who  claim  that  legal  origin  impacts  financial
development primarily through its effect on government centralization.  Their argument is,
therefore, consistent with our use of legal origin as an instrument here.
Furthermore, beyond the institutional justification for legal origin as an instrument, the
set of legal origin dummies perform remarkably well from  a  statistical perspective.  As
shown by the F-test statistic on the joint significance in the first stage regression, the legal
origin dummies are good predictors of the degree of decentralization. The over-identifying
restriction test (reported in table 4) also indicates very decisively that we cannot reject the
hypothesis  of no correlation between the instrunments  and the error  in the regression  of
interest. The legal origin dummies are therefore valid instruments. The estimates from the
two-step  procedure  confirm  our  findings  from  OLS  estimation:  a  higher  degree  of
decentralization is associated with lower measured corruption for the ICRG, the GCI, and
the WCRCI indices.
8III  Conclusions
In  this  paper,  we  have  made  an  initial  assessment  of  the  relationship  between
decentralization  and  corruption.  While  theories  of  decentralization  make  arnbiguous
predictions  about  this  relationship,  we  find  a  very  strong  and  consistent  negative
association between  the two variables across a  sample of countries. This  association  is
robust to controlling for a wide rage of potential sources of omitted variable bias as well as
endogeneity bias.
Although data availability limits the conclusiveness of our results, the evidence in the
paper raises a number of interesting issues for investigation. Among these, whether there
are particular services where decentralized provision has a particularly strong impact on
political  rent-extraction, and understanding the channels through  which decentralization
succeeds  in  keeping  corruption  in  check.  We  leave  these  questions  open  for  further
research.
9Data Description
CORRUPTION  Corruption index, rescaled from 0 to 1 (0=lower corruption).
Source: International  Country  Risk  Guide,  years  1982-90.
Higher  scores  indicate that  high  government  officials  are
likely to demand special payments and that illegal payments
are  generally  expected  throughout  lower  levels  of
government in the form of bribes connected with import and
export licences, exchange  controls, tax  assessment,  policy
protection, or loans.
DECENTRALIZATION  Total  expenditure  of  subnational  (state  and  local)
governments over total spending by  all levels (state, local,
and  central) of  government.  Source:  Government  Finance
Statistics (GFS), International Monetary Fund, for the years
1980-95.
FRACTIONALIZATION  Ethnolinguistic  fractionalization  index  (measures  the
probability that two randomly selected persons from a given
country will not belong to  the same ethnolinguistic group).
Source:  Mauro,  initially  from  the  Atlas  Narodov  Mira
(Department  of  Geodesy  and  Cartography  of  the  State
Geological Committee  of  the USSR,  Moscow,  1964) and
Taylor and Hudson (World Handbook of Political and Social
Indicators, 1972).
Ln(GDP)  Natural logarithm of real GDP per capita in constant dollars,
chain  Index,  expressed  in  international prices,  base  1985.
Source: Summers-Heston, years 1960-1990.
CIVIL LIBERTIES  Gastil index of civil liberties.  Values from 1 to 7, (1=most
freedom) are attributed to countries taking into consideration
such issues as freedom of press, of political association and
trade unions. The index is available for the years  1972-95.
Source: Banks.
SCHOOLING  Average years of schooling in the adult population, available
for 1960-1990. Source: Barro-Lee (1993).
POPULATION  Source: WDI, World Bank.
GOVERNMENT SIZE  Total  government  expenditure  divided  by  GDP.  Source:
Barro (1991), 1980-85.
10OPENNESS  Share of imports on GDP. Source: WDI.
LEGAL ORIGIN  Origin of a country's  legal system.  Source: La Porta et al
(1998).
COLONIAL DUMMIES  Indicators  of  colonial  affiliation.  Sources:  CIA  World
Factbook.
Alternative Measures of Corruption
GCI  Total proportion of deals involving kickbacks, according to
German exporters. Source: Neumann (1994); obtained from
Paolo Mauro.
WCRCI  Corruption index from the World Competitiveness Report;
extent to which improper practices (such as bribing and
corruption) prevail in the public sector. Source: obtained
from Paolo Mauro.
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14Table 1. Summary statistics, cross country data
Average  Observations  Std Deviation  Minimum  Maximum
Corruption, ICRG index  0.66  58  0.24  0  1
Corruption, World Competitiveness Report  0.43  29  0.31  0  1
Corruption, Gernan  exporter index  0.36  43  0.35  0  1
Decentralization index (share of  local and/or state  0.20  65  0.14  0.00  0.57
expenditure on total government expenditure)
GDP  6685  60  4916  312  17152
Population  39  65  106  0  803
Fractionalization  36  52  28  1  89
Openness  65  55  38  15  200
Civil Liberties  3.10  65  1.63  1.00  6.39
Government Share  0.16  63  0.05  0.07  0.31
All values  are averages  over 1980-95;  in the case of GDP  and Population,  these  are geometric  averages.Table  2. OLS cross country  estimates.  Dependent  variable:  Corruption,  ICRG index
OLS
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Decentralization  -0.67  -0.65  -0.72  -0.55  -0.47  -0.59
index  (-4.9)  (-3.32)  (-4.07)  (-3.97)  (-3.06)  (-4.16)
Log of GDP  -0.074  -0.082  -0.05  -0.077  -0.090  -0.057
(-2.08)  (-1.7)  (-1.13)  (-2.09)  (-1.66)  (-1.66)
Civil liberties  0.028  0.026  0.038  0.026  0.033  0.029
(1.55)  (0.84)  (1.37)  (1.36)  (0.91)  (1.39)
Log of population  0.033  0.036  0.010  0.017  0.026  0.026










Colonial dummies  Yes
control  (P=0.00)
N  57  51  54  56  54  57
R?  0.62  0.64  0.66  0.68  0.74  0.73
t-statistics  are  in parentheses.  Standard  errors  are  corrected  for  heteroschedasticity.  When various
dummies  are included  as controls,  p-values  for  the  joint  significance  of such dummies  are reported.Table 3. OLS Cross Country Estimates. Robustness checks
Corruption  WCRCI  GCI
ICRG index
Decentralization index  -0.67  -1.04  -0.50
(-4.9)  (-3.6)  (1.53)
Log of GDP  -0.074  -0.20  -0.23
(-2.08)  (-3.3)  (-3.10)
Civil liberties  0.028  -0.04  -0.036
(1.55)  (-1.29)  (-0.79)
Log of population  0.033  0.08  0.076
(3.02)  (2.27)  (2.46)
N  57  29  43
R2  0.62  0.62  0.52
t-statistics  are  in parentheses.  Standard  errors  are  corrected  for  heteroschedasticity.
17Table 4. Two-Stage Least Squares Cross-Country Estimates
Absence of corruption  WCRCI  GCI
ICRG index
(1)  (2)  (3)
Decentralization index  -1.12  -1.44  -1.07
(-4.65)  (-3.41)  (-2.31)
Log of GDP  -0.0052  -0.18  -0.22
(-1.33)  (-2.19)  (-2.68)
Civil liberties  0.019  -0.062  -0.060
(0.9)  (-1.58)  (-1.17)
Log of population  0.049  0.098  1.01
(3.71)  (2.84)  (3.1)
N  57  29  43
F-test statistic for joint  8.33  8.33  8.33
significance of instruments in
first stage regressions
Over-identifying restrictions  0.90  0.82  0.93
test, P-value
Dummies  for legal origin  of the country  are used as instruments  for  the degree  of decentralization  of public
expenditure.
18Policy  Research  Working  Pape-r  C  sries
Contact
Title  Author  Dlate  for  paper
WP$2277  Determinants of Bulgarian Brady  Nina Budina  January 2000  N. Budina
Bond Prices: An Empirical  Tzvetan Mantchev  82045
Assessment
WPS2278  Liquidity Constraints and Investment  Nina Budina  January 2000  N. Budina
in Transition Economies: The Case  Harry Garretsen  82045
of Bulgaria
WPS2279  Broad Roads in a Thin Country:  Andres G6mez-Lobo  January 2000  G. Chenet-Smith
Infrastructure Concessions in Chile  Sergio Hinojosa  36370
WPS2280  Willingness to Pay for Air Quality  Hua Wang  January 2000  R. Yazigi
Improvements in Sofia, Bulgaria  Dale Whittington  37176
WPS2281  External Sustainability: A Stock  Cesar Calder6n  January 2000  H. Vargas
Equilibrium Perspective  Norman Loayza  38546
WPS2282  Managing Fiscal Risk in Bulgaria  Hana Polackova Brixi  January 2000  L. Zlaoui
Sergei Shatalov  33100
Leila Zlaoui
WPS2283  New Tools and New Tests in  Thorsten Beck  February 2000  P. Sintim-Aboagye
Comparative Political Economy:  George Clarke  38526
The Database of Political Institutions  Alberto Groff
Philip Keefer
Patrick Walsh
WPS2284  The Use of Asset Management  Daniela Klingebiel  February 2000  R. Vo
Companies in the Resolution of  33722
Banking Crises: Cross-Country
Experience
WPS2285  Industrial Environmental Performance  Susmita Dasgupta  February 2000  Y. D'Souza
in China: The Impacts of Inspections  Benoit Laplante  31449
Nlandu Mamingi
Hua Wang
WPS2286  Transparency,  Liberalization,  Gil Mehrez  February 2000  D. Bouvet
and Banking Crises  Daniel Kaufmann  35818
WPS2287  The Vicious Circles of Control:  Raj M. Desai  February 2000  S. Cox
Regional Governments and Insiders  Itzhak Goldberg  36633
in Privatized Russian Enterprises
WPS2288  Ten Years of Transformation:  Charles Wyplosz  February 2000  M. Jandu
Macroeconomic  Lessons  33103Policy  Research Working  Paper Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS2289  Exchange  Rate  Overvaluation  and  Howard  J. Shatz  February  2000  L. Tabada
and  Trade Protection:  Lessons  David  G. Tarr  36896
from Experience